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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

NORTH FORK SPECIAL
SERVICE DISTRICT,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20111026-CA
vs.
ROBERT BENNION,
Defendant/Appellant.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ARGUMENT
I.

WHERE NFSSD DOES NOT DISPUTE THAT THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED BY NOT APPLYING UTAH CODE ANN. § 17B-1-904 TO LIMIT
NFSSD'S INTEREST FROM MAY 5, 2008 TO THE PRESENT TO THE
AMOUNT OF $200 PER MONTH, REVERSAL OF SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IS WARRANTED.
In his opening brief on appeal, Mr. Bennion argued that in rendering summary

judgment in favor of NFSSD, the trial court erred by failing to apply the $200 monthly
interest limitation as prescribed by UTAH CODE ANN. § 17B-1-904 to this case.1 See Br.

NFSSD does not dispute that this issue was properly preserved in the trial court.
See generally Br. of Aple.
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i

of Aplt at 2L NFSSD's response brief is silent as to that issue—NFSSD's silence is

i
deafening. See generally Br. of Aple.
In relevant part Section 17B-1-904 states:
(5) (a) A local district may file a civil action against the customer if the
customer fails to pay the past due service fees and collection costs within
30 calendar days from the date on which the local district mailed notice
under Subsection (2)(b).
(b) (i) In a civil action under this Subsection (5), a customer is liable to the
local district for an amount that:
(A) consists of past due service fees, collection costs, interest, court costs, a
reasonable attorney's fee, and damages; and
(B) if the customer's property is residential may not exceed $200.
(ii) Notwithstanding Subsection (5)(b)(i), a court may, upon a finding of
good cause, waive interest, court costs, the attorney fee, and damages, or
any combination of them.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 17B-1 -904(5) (2011) (emphasis added).
At summary judgment the trial court awarded NFSSD 12% per annum interest in
the amount of $61,155.22, plus continuing interest at 12% per annum on a judgment
amount of $99,041.38. See R. 408-09. The trial court's award of interest included
interest accrued from May 8, 2005 to the present. See id. The trial court's award of
interest to NFSSD clearly exceeds an amount of $200 per month. See id. Because on
May 8, 2005 the Utah Legislature expressly made the $200 monthly interest limitation
prescribed by Section 17B-1-904 applicable to special service districts (See UTAH CODE
ANN. § 17D-1-106 (2011) (enacted on May 8, 2005)), the trial court erred by failing to
apply that mandatory interest limitation to this case. On that basis alone, reversal of

2
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*

.

summary judgment is warranted, and this case should be remanded back to the trial court
for correction of that material error.
IL

WHERE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF UTAH CODE ANN, § 17B-2-804 LIMITS
NFSSD'S SERVICE FEES TO $200 PER MONTH, THE TRIAL COURT'S
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AWARD OF DAMAGES EXCEEDING THAT
LIMITATION SHOULD BE REVERSED,
On appeal Mr. Bennion claims that the trial court erred by not properly applying

the service fee limitation of $200 per month as prescribed by UTAH CODE ANN. § 17B-2804. See Br. of Aplt 17-21. In response, NFSSD argues that special service districts are
entitled to collect much more than a total of $200 per month when they bring a lawsuit
for the collection of unpaid user fees. See Br. of Aple. at 11. In support of its argument,
NFSSD claims that, standing alone, the language of 17B-2-804 is ambiguous as to
whether the $200 limitation prescribed by Section 17B-2-804 is applicable to NFSSD's
award of damages on summary judgment, see id. While giving short shrift to the plain
language of the statute itself, NFSSD asks this Court to examine the language of other
statutes, the practicality or public policy of the statute and the statute's legislative history
to determine the Legislature's statutory intent. See id. at 11-21. Alternatively, NFSSD
claims that Mr. Bennion did not properly preserve this issue in the trial court. Id. at 2126. NFSSD's claims lacks merit.
A.

The $200 Monthly Damages Limitation Prescribed by Section 17B-2-803(3) is
Unambiguous in its Application to NFSSD's Past Due Service Fees and
Collection Costs.
In this appeal both parties agree that this Court is tasked with interpreting whether

Section 17B-2-804(3) is applicable to this case. See Br. of Aple. at 11-14. When
3
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interpreting a statute, an appellate court's primary objective "'is to give effect to the
legislature's intent.'" Alliant Techsystems, Inc. v. Salt Lake Bd. of Equalization, 2012 UT
4, U 21, 270 P.3d 441 (citations omitted). "To discern legislative intent, [an appellate
court] look[s] first to the statute's language." Id. While performing that task, "'[aa
appellate court] presume[s] that the legislature used each word advisedly and read[s] each
term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning.'" Id. (citations omitted).
"Additionally, [an appellate court] read[s] the text of a statute as a whole and interpret its
provisions in harmony with other subsections." Id. If "'the . . . meaning of [a] statute
can be discerned from its language, no other interpretive tools are needed.'" Id.
(citations omitted) (brackets in original). It is only "where the language of a statute is
ambiguous, [that an appellate court] may look beyond the statute's text in order to
ascertain its legislative purpose." Id.; see e.g. Baby E.Z. v. T.I.Z, 2011 UT 38, f 15, 266
P.3d 702 ("Unless we find ambiguity in a statute, we do not look to legislative history or
public policy to try to glean the statute's intent.").
1.

The Plain Language of Section 17B-2-804(3) Includes Past Due Service
Fees of the Type Awarded to NFSSD by the Trial Court.

In this case, NFSSD argues that the $200 limitation prescribed by Section 17B-2804(3) should be read only to limit to an amount of $200 the "collection costs" that a
special service district can collect in a civil action, and should not be applied to
"delinquent user fees." Br. of Aple. at 11-12. However, in making that argument
NFSSD ignores the statutory phrase "past due service fees" as is clearly contained in
4
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Section 17B-2-804(3)(b)(i)(A). SeeAlliant Techsystems, Inc., 2012 UT 4, f 21 ('"[An
appellate court] presume[s] that the legislature used each word advisedly[.]'") (citation
omitted).
In relevant part, Section 17B-2-804(3) states:
(3) (a) A local district may file a civil action against the customer if the
customer fails to pay the past due service fees and collection costs within
30 calendar days from the date on which the local district mailed notice
under Subsection (l)(b).
(b) (i) In a civil action under this Subsection (3), a customer is liable to the
local district for an amount that:
(A) consists of past due service fees, collection costs, interest, court costs, a
reasonable attorney's fee, and damages; and
(B) if the customer's property is residential, may not exceed $200.
(ii) Notwithstanding Subsection (3)(b)(i), a court may, upon a finding of
good cause, waive interest, court costs, the attorney's fee, and damages, or
any combination of them.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 17B-2-804(3) (2004) (emphasis added). As is illustrated by that
recitation, NFSSD's interpretation runs afoul of the plain language of Section 17B-2804(3). Section 17B-2-804(3)(b) clearly states that the $200 limitation is applicable to
both "past due service fees" and to "collection costs," both of which are named in the
statute. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 17B-2-804(3)(b)(i)(A) (2004). Thus, there is no
ambiguity in Section 17B-2-804(3), which would limit the applicability of its $200
limitation only to NFSSD's collection costs.
Additionally, there is no dispute that the damages awarded to NFSSD by the trial
court constituted "past due service fees" as that phrase is defined by Title 17B, Chapter 2,
Part 8. The statutory definition of the term "service fees" as used in Section 17B-2-804 is

5
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"the amount charged by a local district to a customer for water furnished or sewer service
provided to the customer's property." UTAH CODE ANN. § 17B-2-801(7) (2004); see also
UTAH CODE ANN. § 17A-1-205 (2004) (making the provisions of Title 17B, Chapter 2,
Part 8 applicable to special service districts). Additionally, Section 17B-2-801 defines
the phrase "past due service fees" as "service fees that on or after the default date have
not been paid[,]" or in other words are delinquent. See id, at § 17B-2-801(5) (2004).
In its motion for summary judgment pleadings, NFSSD repeatedly classifies itself
as a provider of "water services," and requests damages for water allegedly furnished by
NFSSD to Mr. Bennion. See R. 202-07. In its reply to Mr. Bennion's opposition to
NFSSD's motion for summary judgment, NFSSD affirmatively states "[t]his is a simple
collection case for past due base user fees and excess water usage fees." R. 301. More
importantly, in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on NFSSD's Motion for
Summary Judgment, the trial court uses the same "water services" language in awarding
NFSSD damages constituting past due service fees, which damages clearly exceed the
statutory $200 limitation prescribed by Section 17B-2-804(3). See R. 408-13. Because
NFSSD's damages awarded by the trial court on summary judgment constitute "past due
service fees," NFSSD cannot claim that it is exempt from the $200 limitation of Section
17B-2-804.
Given the plain language of Section 17B-2-804 and the fact that NFSSD's
damages constitute "past due service fees," the trial court erred by not limiting NFSSD's

6
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damages for past due water service fees and collection costs to the statutory amount of
$200 per month. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 17B-2-804(3) (2004).
2.

The Other Provisions of Section 17B-2-804 Harmoniously Support the
Applicability of the $200 Limitation of NFSSD's Past Due Service Fees.

NFSSD next asserts that the other provisions of Section 17B-2-804 do not support
the applicability of the $200 limitation of NFSSD's past due service fees. See Br. of
Aple. at 16-18. In making that argument, NFSSD incorrectly summarizes the steps
prescribed by Section 17B-2-804, which a special service district must take before filing
a civil lawsuit to collect past due service fees. Only two steps are required. First, the
special service district must mail notice of the past due service fees to the user. See
UTAH CODE ANN. § 17B-2-804(l) (2004). Although the special service district may next
make an offer to the customer that it will forgo the filing of a lawsuit if a $150 ($100
maximum past due service fee plus a $50 attorney's fee) payment is made, that step is
optional. See id. at § 17B-2-804(2) (2004). Second, provided that proper notice is sent as
required by the first step, the special service district may then file suit to recover past due
service fees and collection costs, which may not exceed the amount of $200 for
residential customers. See id. at § 17B-2-804(3) (2004). Those provisions are in
complete harmony with the $200 limitation prescribed by Section 17B-2-804. The
simple truth is that NFSSD does not like the remedies that the Legislature chose to give
to special service districts. Nonetheless, NFSSD's dissatisfaction does not render Section
17B-2-804(3) ambiguous.

7
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3.

The Language Contained in Statutes Related To Section 17B-2-804
Harmoniously Supports the Applicability of the $200 Limitation of
Past Due Service Fees.

Additionally, NFSSD argues that the language contained in UTAH CODE ANN. §§
17B-2-802 and 17B-2-803 are not in harmony with the $200 limitation prescribed by
Section 17B-2-804. This argument is wholly lacking in merit Section 17B-2-802
provides special service districts with the additional, and very effective, remedy of
discontinuation of services in the event of non-payment for services rendered. See UTAH
CODE ANN. § 17B-2-802 (2004). Section 17B-2-803, on the other hand, permits a special
service district to file a lien against a customer's real property if he fails to pay past due
service fees. See id. at § 17B-2-803 (2004). Contrary to NFSSD's assertions, both of
these remedies coexist harmoniously with the $200 limitation prescribed by Section 17B2-804. It is clear from reading those sections together with Section 17B-2-804, that the
Legislature opted to give special service districts various tools to obtain payment for past
due service fees. A special service district may file a lawsuit, record a lien on real
property or shut off the water to a non-paying customer. As such, a special service
district is advantaged in that it may choose which of those tools would be most effective
and economical in a given situation. In any event, nothing in the language or application
of Sections 17B-2-802 and 17B-2-803 conflicts with the requisite $200 limitation
prescribed by Section 17B-2-804.

8
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4.

The Legislative History Surrounding the Enactment of Section 17B-2804 is Both Irrelevant and Unhelpful to an Interpretation of that
Statute.

NFSSD also argues that a confusing excerpt from a legislative hearing on
February 16, 2004, is somehow helpful in showing that the $200 limitation prescribed by
Section 17B-2-804 pertains only to the collection costs of a special service district. "[An
appellate court's] role in interpreting [a] statute is to read and interpret its text." Myers v.
Myers, 2011 UT 65, f 28, 266 P.3d 806. Only "[i]f that text is ambiguous, [] may [an
appellate court] look to legislative history to inform [its] construction of the statutory
language." Id. Moreover, "legislative history is not law[;] [i]t is at most of secondary
relevance in informing [a court's] construction of the law, which is found in the statutory
text." Id. Because, as is shown above, Section 17B-2-804 is not ambiguous the
legislative history cited by NFSSD is irrelevant to this Court's statutory interpretation.
The legislative history cited by NFSSD is also unhelpful to an interpretation of the
$200 limitation prescribed by Section 17B-2-804. The excerpt cited by NFSSD consists
of an exchange between the Sponsor of an amendment and a Representative apparently
opposed to the amendment. See Br. of Aple. at 19-20. There is, however, no indication
of what the amendment is that was the subject of the debate, or if that amendment passed
and actually became part of Section 17B-2-804. See id. Moreover, it is difficult to
identify the subject matter of the speaker's statements. For example, presumably
regarding a $200 damages limitation, the statement is made, "I'm not sure that this deals
with the service aspect of it, but this deals with what's available to the district for
9
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collecting." Id, at 19. Then the question is asked, "Do you have an opinion on that?" Id,
The amendment's Sponsor's answer is ambiguous and confusing at best; "Well it
wouldn't cover the entire thing, but it would be closer than $200 would." Id, The subject
of the word "it" as used twice in the Sponsor's statement simply cannot be identified
within the context of the complete excerpt. See id. Accordingly, the excerpt of
legislative history provided by NFSSD is wholly unhelpful and unreliable in informing
this Court as to the construction of the language of Section 17B-2-804. See Myers, 2011
UT65,t28.
5.

NFSSD's Request that this Court to Consider the Practicality or Public
Policy Applications of Section 17B-2-804Q) in Interpreting that Statute
is Improper.

Throughout its argument, NFSSD consistently invites this Court to consider the
practicality or the public policy applications of the $200 limitation as prescribed by
Section 17B-2-804(3). See e.g. Br. of Aple. at 11, 15 and 17 (asking that this Court find
Section 17B-2-804(3) to be ambiguous because its application is impractical). NFSSD's
invitation for this Court to enter the realm of legislative policy making is wholly
improper. "It is the power and responsibility of the Legislature to enact laws to promote
the public health, safety, morals and general welfare of society, and this Court will not
substitute our judgment for that of the Legislature with respect to what best serves the
public interest." Bastian v. King, 661 P.2d 953, 956 (Utah 1983) (citations omitted). See
also State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 362 (Utah 1995) ("[D]elicate balancing of public
policy is better accomplished in the Iegislaliire than in the courts."); Redwood Gym v. Salt
10
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Lake Cnty. Comm '/x., 624 P.2d 1138, 1143 (Utah 1981) ("It is not the function of this
Court to evaluate the wisdom or practical necessity of legislative enactments.").
In the instant case, the plain language of Section 17B-2-804 includes the type of
past due service fees awarded to NFSSD by the trial court at summary judgment. As
such, the trial court erred by not limiting NFSSD's service fees to $200 per month in
conformity with the plain language of Section 17B-2-804(3). On appeal, NFSSD is
clearly discontent with the fact that the Utah Legislature chose to prevent a special
service district from obtaining more that $200 in damages for monthly past due service
fees in litigation against a residential customer. But NFSSD must nonetheless comply
with the statute's provisions. Rather than comply, NFSSD is asking this Court to render
public policy decisions based on Section 17B-2-804. However, by directive from the
Utah Supreme Court, this Court is prohibited from considering whether the plain
language of Section 17B-2-804(3), mandating the $200 limitation on "past due service
fees," is practical or whether it makes for good public policy. See UTAH CODE ANN. §
17B-2-804(3) (2004); Bastian, 661 P.2d at 956. Those are decisions which have already
been made by the Utah Legislature through the enactment of Section 17B-2-804. On
those grounds, this Court should ignore NFSSD's improper request to engage in
legislative policy making, and reverse the trial court for failing to enforce the plain
language of Section 17B-2-804(3), which clearly prescribes a $200 limitation on
NFSSD's past due service fees.

11
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i

B.

The Issue of Whether the $200 Damages Limitation Prescribed by Section
17B-2-804(3) Applies to this Case was Properly Preserved Before the Trial
Court.

(

In addition to claiming that Section 17B-2-804 is ambiguous, NFSSD also argues
that the issue of whether the $200 limitation prescribed by Section 17B-2-804(3) should
apply to this case was not properly preserved in the trial court, NFSSD is mistaken. The
record on appeal demonstrates diat this issue was properly preserved before the trial
court.
"[An appellate court] generally will not consider an issue unless it has been
preserved for appeal. Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68, % 12, 266 P.3d 828. "An issue
is preserved for appeal when it has been 'presented to the district court in such a way that
the court has an opportunity to rule on [it].'" Id. (citing J.M. W. v. T.I.Z. (In Re Adoption
ofBabyE.Z), 2011 UT 38, \25, 266 P.3 d 702) (additional internal quotation marks
omitted).
When considering the applicability of the preservation rule, it is useful to examine
its underlying policies. See id. at U 15. "The two primary considerations underlying the
rule are judicial economy and fairness." Id. Judicial economy is furthered by the
preservation rule in that it gives the trial court an opportunity to address the claimed error
and to, if necessary, correct it. Id. Additionally, "[o]rderly procedure .. . requires that a
party must present his entire case and his theory... of recovery to the trial court."
Dansie v. City ofHerriman, 2006 UT 23, \ 30, 134 P.3d 1139 (first and second
alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). "The policy of judicial
12

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

<

economy is most directly frustrated when an appellant asserts unpreserved claims that
require factual predicates." For that reason, appellate courts should apply the
preservation rule more strictly when the asserted new issue or theory "depends on
controverted factual questions whose relevance thereto was not made to appear at trial."
James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah App. 1987) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
"The second consideration underlying the preservation rule is fairness."
Patterson, 2011 UT 68, f 16. "It generally would be unfair to reverse a district court for
a reason presented first on appeal." Id. Our judicial system dictates that "the
responsibility for detecting error is on the party asserting it, not on the court." Id. As
such, "[njotions of fairness therefore dictate that a party should be given an opportunity
to address the alleged error in the trial court." Id. "Having been given such a chance, the
party opposing a claim of error might have countered the argument, potentially avoiding
the time and expense of appeal." Id. Lastly, "'requiring preservation of an issue prevents
a party from avoiding the issue at trial for strategic reasons only to raise the issue on
appeal if the strategy fails/" Id. (citiations omitted).
The test to determine whether an issue has been preserved, requires consideration
of the following three factors: "(1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion; (2) the
issue must be specifically raised; and (3) a party must introduce supporting evidence or
relevant legal authority." Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, % 15, 164 P.3d 366 (internal
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quotation marks omitted). Contrary to NFSSD's argument, Mr. Bennion satisfied each of
those factors.
L

Mr. Bennion Timely Raised the Issue of Whether the $200 Limitation
Prescribed by Section 17B-2-804 Applies to this Case.

The record facts of this case illustrate that Mr. Bennion timely raised the issue of
whether the $200 limitation prescribed by Section 17B-2-804 applies to this case.
Following NFSSD's filing of its complaint in this case, Mr. Bennion filed a motion to
dismiss. See R. 21-27. The trial court rendered a partial decision on Mr. Bennion's
motion to dismiss, and then ordered the parties to provide supplemental briefing as to
other issues. See R. 58, 81. In reply to the supplemental brief submitted by NFSSD, Mr.
Bennion raised the issue of whether NFSSD was bound to the $200 limitation prescribed
by Section 17B-2-804. See R. 140-43. NFSSD concedes this fact on appeal. See Br. of
Aple. at 23.
Mr. Bennion again asserted that argument in opposition to NFSSD's motion for
summary judgment. See R. 246-48. NFSSD also concedes this fact. See Br. of Aple. at
24. In its summary judgment practice before the trial court, rather than respond to Mr.
Bennion's argument that the $200 limitation of Section 17B-2-804 applies to this case,
NFSSD moved to strike it as redundant. See R. 265-90; 300-05. In its reply to Mr.
Bennion's opposition to NFSSD's motion to strike, NFSSD acknowledges that the issue
of whether NFSSD was bound to the $200 limitation prescribed by Section 17B-2-804
was in fact previously raised before the court. R. 302. Specifically, NFSSD quotes the
14
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trial court's order; "the Court's ruling on October 25, 2008, stated that 'the court declines
to apply' Utah Code Ann. § 17D-1 -106 'and other sections applicable to special service
districts.. .retroactively." R. 302 (quoting R. 152-55) (emphasis added). NFSSD's
motion for summary judgment and motion to strike were simultaneously heard and
decided by the trial court at the hearing on June 8, 2011. R. 445. On that basis, the
record demonstrates that the issue of whether the $200 limitation of Section 17B-2-804
applies to this case was timely placed before the trial court on two separate occasions.
2.

Mr. Bennion Specifically Raised the Issue of Whether the $200
Limitation Prescribed by Section 17B-2-804 Applies to this Case.

In his supplemental reply memorandum in support of his motion to dismiss, Mr.
Bennion specifically informed the trial court that "[a]s of the date § 17A-1-205 became
effective (May 3, 2004), Utah Code Ann. § 17B-2-804 limited the amount a local district
could collect for 'past due service fees and collections costs" to $200, if the property
involved was residential." R. 142. Mr. Bennion then argued that this section applies to
special service districts including NFSSD. See R. 140-42.2 Later, in opposition to
NFSSD's motion for summary judgment, Mr. Bennion specifically argued that the $200
limitation "has been in place since May 3, 2004 [and] [a]t that date, what is now § 17B-1-

2

On appeal, NFSSD attempts to discredit Mr. Bennion's preservation of this issue
during the motion to dismiss proceedings by asserting that the trial court did not authorize
the filing of Mr. Bennion's supplemental reply memorandum. See Br. of Aple. at 23. In
light of the fact that NFSSD later acknowledged that the trial court actually considered
whether the $200 limitation of Section 17B-2-804 applies to this case in deciding the
motion to dismiss, NFSSD's attempt to discredit Mr. Bennion's preservation effort fails.
See R. 302 (quoting R. 152-55).
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i

904 became law as § 17B-2-804." R. 247. Mr. Bennion further requested that the court
deny the motion for summary judgment on jgrounds that NFSSD's damages are limited to
the amount prescribed by Section 17B-2-804.3 See R. 246-47. In light of those particular
arguments, Mr. Bennion specifically preserved the issue of whether the $200 limitation
prescribed by Section 17B-2-804 applies to this case.
Additionally, there is no dispute that both NFSSD and the trial court were
provided an opportunity to address Mr. Bennion's arguments regarding the applicability
of the $200 limitation prescribed by Section 17B-2-804. Throughout the course of the
litigation, NFSSD had ample opportunity to respond to Mr. Bennion's arguments.
NFSSD submitted both a reply memorandum to Mr. Bennion's opposition to the motion
for summary judgment and a motion to strike Mr. Bennion's argument as redundant. See

3

NFSSD argues that Mr. Bennion's preservation of his claim that the $200
limitation prescribed by Section 17B-2-804 is invalid because it was stricken by the
Court at summary judgment. See Br. of Aple. at 24. However, that argument fails to
recognize that at the hearing on June 8, 2011, the trial court considered Mr. Bennion's
pleadings in opposition to NFSSD's motion for summary judgment and NFSSD's motion
to strike at the same time. See R. 403. As such, the issue regarding the applicability of
the $200 limitation prescribed by Section 17B-2-804 was, at the very least, considered by
the trial court before it was stricken.
NFSSD also claims that Mr. Bennion failed to raise the issue regarding the
applicability of the $200 limitation prescribed by Section 17B-2-804 at oral argument on
June 8, 2011. See Br. of Aple. at 24. However, Mr. Bennion represented himself at the
June 8, 2011 hearing. The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held that because of a lack
of technical knowledge of law and procedure, whenever possible a layman acting as his
own attorney should be accorded every consideration that may reasonably be indulged.
Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207,1213 (Utah 1983). As such, the fact that Mr.
Bennion did not address the $200 limitation of Section 17B-2-804 bears no significant
consequence. Moreover, as shown above, that issue was adequately preserved in Mr.
Bennion's pleadings. SeeR. 140-42; 246-47.
16
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R. 265-90; 300-05. Thus, where NFSSD had an opportunity in the trial court to address
the errors claimed by Mr. Bennion on appeal, the doctrine of fairness is satisfied. See
Patterson, 2011 UT 68, % 16. Similarly, by raising the issue during proceedings on both
the motion to dismiss and on summary judgment, Mr. Bennion gave the trial court ample
opportunity to address the applicability of Section 17B-2-804 to this case. Accordingly,
the demands of the doctrine ofjudicial economy were also satisfied by Mr. Bennion's
preservation efforts. See Patterson, 2011 UT 68, ^f 15.
3.

Mr. Bennion Provided the Trial Court with Relevant Legal Authority
to Support his Claim that NFSSD's Damages Should be Limited to
$200 Per Month.

By way of his pleadings in favor of the motion to dismiss and in opposition to the
motion for summary judgment, Mr. Bennion provided the trial court with relevant legal
authority to reduce NFSSD's damages to the amount of $200 per month. NFSSD cites no
case law, and Mr. Bennion is aware of none, which is specific to the issue of whether a
special services district's past due service fees should be limited to $200 per month.
Given the lack of common law guidance, Mr. Bennion provided the trial court with the
only relevant legal authority necessary to decide this issue—the statute itself. As was
argued by Mr. Benmon to the trial court, the plain language of Section 17B-2-804 limits
NFSSD's damages for past due service fees and collection costs to the maximum amount
of $200. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 17B-2-804(3) (2004). In any event, because the
applicability of the $200 limitation prescribed by Section 17B-2-804 involves the
interpretation of a statute and does not involve controverted questions of fact, the
17
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preservation rule should not be strictly applied to this case. See Patterson, 2011 UT 68, ^
15. Accordingly, Mr. Bennion wholly complied with the preservation requirements as
dictated by Utah law.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Mr. Bennion respectfully requests that this Court
reverse the trial court's summary judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted this
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